Abstract -This paper suggests that evolutionary models of network infrastructure in market economy can be derived from the underlying selfish behavior of users and providers of network services in the same way as non-equilibrium thermodynamics is derived from the underlying statistical physics of interacting particles.
INTRODUCTION
In market economy network evolution is driven by technological constraints and self-interests of the participants. Each user generates demand in attempt to maximize its net utilities, which is the difference between the utility of obtaining service and the service price while each service provider attempts to maximize its profit, which is the difference between the revenue and expenses. We model a network by a capacitated graph with links/nodes owned by different providers. The key feature of our model is that providers not only can expand/reduce network capacity within infrastructure represented by the network graph, but also have option to modify network infrastructure by adding/eliminating network links. While capacity expansion within fixed infrastructure can be done at the marginal cost of the resources, growing network infrastructure by adding links/nodes requires initial and typically significant investment, e.g., for putting fiber underground.
This initial investment typically destroys convexity and causes multiplicity of Nash equilibrium infrastructures in the natural game-theoretic formalization of the selfish user/provider behavior making interpretation of this gametheoretic model difficult. This difficulty has led to using game-theoretic models of selfish user/provider behavior only for fixed network infrastructure when the corresponding game typically has unique Nash equilibrium in demand, pricing, investments, and capacities. Separate modeling of infrastructure growth typically relies on phenomenological random graph models [1] - [3] .
However, accounting for the effect of user/provider economic incentives on the network infrastructure evolution may be essential. For example, result of selfish investment in the network security [4] can be affected if network users and providers have an option of disconnecting from providers creating or propagating security risk. Another example is selfish investment in the bandwidth within existing infrastructure. The inefficiency of the competitive equilibrium in the bandwidth pricings and offerings [5] may be a result of inefficient network infrastructure, which prevents provider competition. In both examples provider ability to modify infrastructure may significantly affect the emerging network infrastructure.
This paper suggests that infrastructure evolutionary models can be derived from the underlying game-theoretic model of selfish user/provider behavior in the same way as non-equilibrium thermodynamics is derived from the underlying statistical physics of interacting particles. We assume time scale separation between "fast" convergence to user/provider equilibrium for a given network infrastructure and "slow" infrastructure evolution modeled by Markov process. We consider a situation of almost perfect competition when a large number of providers compete for demand generated by the same users [6] . Based on results from economics [6] as well as results for some particular networks [7] - [9] we conjecture that selfish user/provider behavior maximizes the aggregate user utility subject to provider profitability.
Exploiting similarities between utility maximization and entropy maximization by closed physical system with fixed energy [10] we propose to model the infrastructure evolution by a time-reversible Markov process. The proposed model includes a possibility of selfish investment in the network security and open to various generalizations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses user/provider competitive and socially optimal equilibria. Section III proposes network infrastructure models consistent with underlying selfish user/provider interactions. Finally, Section IV briefly summarizes and outlines directions of future research.
II.
NETWORK ECONOMIC MODEL This Section describes economics driving user/provider strategic interactions. Subsection A describes network model. Subsection B describes bandwidth supply/demand model.
A. Network
We model network by a directed capacitated graph with set of nodes N and set of links 
B. Bandwidth Users and Providers
We model effect of investment in the network security by assuming that traffic of rate x traversing network element l faces security risk ) (q xh l , where vector of levels of investment in the security of network elements l is ) ,
We assume functions ) (q h l to be decreasing in the all vector q components due to the positive externalities, i.e., improving security of a network element not only improves this element security but also is beneficial for security of the entire network [4] .
Assuming that the owner of a network element l charges users price l p for a unit of this element's bandwidth, the profit generated by network element l is ) ( ) ( 
We assume that each users is uniquely identified by the origin-destination pair 
III.
USER/PROVIDER EQUILIBRIA This Section introduces notions of user/provider equilibria.
Subsection A describes user/provider best responses. Subsection B discusses multiplicity of the competitive (Nash) equilibria of the user/provider game. Subsection C conjectures that perfect competition these competitive equilibria approach the social optimum.
A. User/Provider Best Responses
It is easy to see that user net utility (7) maximization results in minimum cost routing where the adjusted cost of a route is the sum of the adjusted costs of network elements comprising the route
Assuming sufficient capacity, the entire user 
Further in the paper we assume that users always generate the best response demand, and thus profit generated
Expression (14) implies that the optimal provider responses ensure tightness of the capacity constraints (2). Indeed, providers have incentive to eliminate any spare capacity to reduce expenses while in a case of insufficient capacity the corresponding provider can increase its revenue by raising the bandwidth price.
B. Competitive Equilibria
Consider a non-cooperative game of providers S s ∈ attempting to maximize their profits are given by (14). Typically, this game has multiple Nash equilibria corresponding to different network infrastructures defined by a combination of network topology and ownership of network elements. These Nash equilibria are associated with attractors of the following evolutionary/learning provider adjustments [13] :
, ( * * (16) Note that since best user response (8)- (12) ) , (
Bertrand's model of user/provider equilibria [9] , [15] assumes that in "fast" time users/providers achieve equilibrium over user demands Figure 1 demonstrates multiplicity of provider equilibria achieved by adjustment process (17) on an example of two providers competing for the same demand [9] . 
C
Three equilibria are possible: one equilibrium with both providers supplying bandwidth and two equilibria with only one provider supplying bandwidth and another provider driven out of business.
C. Perfect Competition: Social Optimum
In competitive equilibrium providers ensure profitability by charging users competitive price which is higher than the marginal bandwidth price. It is known from economics [6] that as number of providers competing for the same demand, the competitive prices drop approaching the corresponding marginal prices. This increase in competition squeezes the provider profit margins but increases user net utilities as shown in Figures 2 and 3 respectively for N parallel links competing for demand generated by the same users [8] - [9] . 
A. Infrastructure Utility
Optimization problem (18)- (20) is non-convex due to assumed concavity of the communication bandwidth cost functions
. It is known that this non-convexity leads to multiple local maxima of the aggregate utility (19). However, given vector 
In a case of bandwidth cost function (3) social welfare (24) takes the following form: 
V.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH Assuming that the network infrastructure is represented by the network graph and ownership, this paper suggests that network infrastructure modeling should be based on the network microeconomics.
The paper argues that methodologies used in transitions from statistical physics of a large number of interaction particles to thermodynamics of a small number of macro-variables may prove applicable to networking domain. The proposed approach assumes that "almost perfect competition" keeps the system close to social optimum, which maximizes the aggregate user utility subject to provider profitability. Future research will be concentrated on demonstrating the practical validity of the proposed approach and extending this approach to competitive user/provider equilibria far from perfect competition.
